In a rare show of unity, Apple and Google have been working together to provide a contact-tracing API for the iOS and Android platforms. Developers can use this to build apps. In forthcoming releases of the operating systems, this capability will be baked in.

The API uses Bluetooth in a highly anonymous way. Information is decentralised -- in effect, each device carries the information it needs. Some data needs to be stored on central servers, but none of that contains personal information.

However, in a move that should give everyone pause for thought, it was precisely that lack of centrally held data that made the UK Government decide to ignore the Apple/Google solution. It wants to store all the interactions between devices in a single database, claiming that this will allow it to usefully analyse the information to find infection hotspots. It\'s not clear what mechanisms will be employed to alert users who have had a close shave with an infected person, but NHSX -- the National Health Service\'s technology arm -- has said that the only personal data stored in the database will be part of the user\'s postcode. Oh, and at a possible future date maybe they\'ll ask for location data too. How they\'ll spot hotspots without this data isn\'t explained.

So far, the UK version doesn\'t sound that much more intrusive than Apple/Google\'s. However, there are some real problems. First, while Apple and Google have said that the data stored on devices using their API will expire after 14 days, and that the whole service will be switched off when the pandemic\'s over, NHSX has stated that it plans to hold on to the data for future, unspecified uses within the NHS. (And the NHS doesn\'t have a great track record of keeping medical data out of the hands of private companies.)

The UK\'s app will also be incompatible with those developed using the Apple/Google API, which might have ramifications for future international travel (although, to be fair, some other nations such as France are also developing centralised solutions).

The biggest problem, though, is that it won\'t work. Or, at least, not well. Android and iOS have made great strides in security and one example of this is how the operating systems do not allow apps to use Bluetooth unless they are running and currently selected. Part of the reason for this is to prevent tracking and having devices subject to location-based, personalised ads.

Apple and Google, having full control over the operating systems, can get around these limitations, and ensure that any loosening of security controls only goes as far as is needed to implement the contact tracing functionality. NHSX has no such powers. In theory, an iPhone in someone\'s pocket or bag is likely to be in sleep mode, so even if the contact-tracing app was the last one you used, it won\'t be able to use Bluetooth.

NHSX says it has found ways around this, but how effective they will be is anybody\'s guess -- and my guess is, not very. Add that to the fact that use of the app is optional anyway, and it looks like the number of devices that will be actively and effectively taking part in this contact-tracing operation will be a small and possibly meaningless subset of the population. It\'s starting to feel like contact-tracing apps are just Covid-theatre, meant to make us feel that something is being done.
